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COURT OP APPEALS, 1955 TERM
on two grounds: first, an illegal delay in arraignment and second, an attempt by
the prosecutor to act as an unsworn witness in his summation to the jury.
The defendant was arrested on a Saturday night and was not arraigned until
Monday morning, notwithstanding the fact that the arresting officers knew there
was. a court open on Sunday in which he could have been arraigned. The Court
of Appeals held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to charge that such
delay was unnecessary as a matter of law57 and erred further by submitting the
necessity or reasonableness of the delay to the jury as a question of fact.58
Further, defense counsel criticized the prosecutor for his failure to produce
stenographic notes of the defendant's alleged police station statements. The pros-
ecutor in his summation, referring to these statements, said:
"Gentlemen, with all the sincerity at my command, I say to you
that if that conversation did not take place, in your judgment, you
stop right there. Don't waste another ten seconds on this case. Come
back and say that this defendant is not guilty. If that conversation did
not take place, then I am an aider and abetter to Omark's (a police
officer) perjury."
The prosecutor thereby made himself an unsworn witness and supported his
case by his own veracity and position. Such practices have been condemned as
error5 9 and the Court properly reversed the conviction here.
Trial-Prejudlicial Statements by District Attorney
In People v. ReadeG0 the defendant was tried for first degree murder. At
the trial, defense counsel, in his summation to the jury, referred to his brother,
who, being found insane, was confined to a mental institution until his death. The
purpose thereof was obviously to allay the fears of the jury that this defendant,
who had interposed the defense of insanity, would be set free upon the public if
57. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §165. The defendant must in all cases be taken
before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may give bail at any
hour of the day or night. N. Y. PENAL LAW §1844. A public officer or other person
having arrested any person upon a criminal charge, who wilfully and wrongfully
delays to take such person before a magistrate having jurisdiction to take his
examination, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
58. People v. Snyder, 297 N. Y. 81, 91, 92; 74 N. E. 2d 657 (1947); People v.
Koziccy, 275 App. Div. 862, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 286 (1949). The jury may consider an
illegal delay in determining the weight to be given to evidence comprising
statements made by the defendant during the illegal detention. .
59. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); People v. Tassiello, 300
N. Y. 425, 430, 91 N. E. 2d 872, 874 (1949); People v. Swanson, 278 App. Div. 846,
847, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1951).
60. 1 N. Y. 2d 459, 136 N. E. 2d 497 (1956).
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he were acquitted by reason of insanity. To counter this, the district attorney
in his summation told the jury:
"Well, if you find him insane, ladies and gentlemen, you will have
no assurance whatsoever that he won't be back out again .... When he
satisfied the Commission that he is sane, as he is, that will be the end,
he will be back out. No assurance whatsoever have you that they will
keep him out of society. And ladies and gentlemen, that you cannot
afford to let happen."
The Court of Appeals held that this was not error, holding that the district
attorney was justified in answering the intimation of defense counsel that a finding
of insanity was tantamount to confinement for life.
Both the remarks of defense counsel and the district attorney were improper
and constituted reversible error. Such remarks put in issue before the jury the
question of the disposition of the defendant subsequent to its verdict. The jury
functions up to the time of its verdict. Subsequent thereto, the disposition of the
defendant rests with the court,' and if convicted, after sentence further disposition
can be made by the governor and parole board.
2
Where insanity is interposed as a defense, it is for the jury to determine
from the evidence introduced at the trial whether the defendant knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong and knew the nature and quality of his act. Here
their function ends. They may not weigh the end result of their finding in the
context of social repercussions which may follow. The jury may not go beyond its
function to consider the adequacy of the legislation which governs disposition of
a defendant subsequent to their verdict.
To allow the statements made in the instant case to stand conflicts with
New York law which denominates the jury the trier of the facts only0 3 and the
explicit prohibition against the jury's considering the ultimate disposition of the
defendant in arriving at its verdict. 4 This error cannot be resolved by holding
that one statement balances the other. The error was in allowing the question of
ultimate disposition to be considered by the jury in arriving at its verdict.
Error was also committed by the trial judge's answering the question of the
jury as to whether or not, if they recommend life imprisonment, the defendant
could be released on parole. While the trial judge is required to answer the
questions of the jury,6 5 it is obvious that he is not required to answer all questions.
61. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §482.
62. N. Y. CODE CalM. PROC. §§692-698, N. Y. CORRECTiON LAW Art. 8.
63. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROc. §419.
64. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §420.
65. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §427.
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He would be barred from answering questions as to the punishment for various
degrees of a crime with which a defendant is charged. This would directly violate
the statutory prohibition thereof.66
In the instant case answering the question as to parole was likewise improper.
Here, life imprisonment must be taken at its face value. If the question of parole
is interjected, it once again calls for consideration of matters extraneous to the
jury's consideration. From the fact that the jury must agree unanimously upon a
recommendation or non-recommendation of life imprisonment,6 7 it is apparent
that this constitutes an integral part of the verdict. The considerations in deter-
mining whether such a recommendation should be made turn primarily upon
comparative moral blameworthiness.0 8 In no event, however, should the jury be
allowed to consider the working of the parole system any more than it should
consider the possibility of pardon or commutation of sentence in determining
whether the death sentence should be applied. The conviction in this case should
have been reversed.
Sentence-Habitual Criminal
New York's habitual criminal statutes 9 have not been looked upon with
favor by its judiciary.70 In a case decided in 1930, the Court of Appeals observed:
"If the sentence under review stands, the relator who is twenty-five years of age,
because he had previously stolen chickens, certain automobile parts, and a motor
cycle, must spend the remainder of his days in a State's prison".71 Of course, the
sentence did not stand.
Although the mandatory life sentence of the Baumes Law72 has given way
66. N. Y. CODE CRUM. PROC. §420.
67. People v. Hicks, 287 N. Y. 165, 169, 38 N. E. 2d 482 (1941).
68. See note 67 supra.
69. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1941. Punishment for second or third offense of felony.
1. (A) person, who after having been once or twice convicted . . . of a felony
commits any felony . . . is punishable upon conviction . . . as follows:
If the second or third felony is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender
would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life,
then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term,
the minimum of which shall not be less than one-half of the longest term
prescribed upon a first conviction, and the maximum of which shall not be longer
than twice such longest term. N. Y. PENAL LAW §1942. Punishment for fourth
conviction of felony. A person who, after having been three times convicted
within this state, of felonies.., commits any felony other than murder ... shall
be sentenced upon conviction... to imprisonment ... for an indeterminate term
the minimum of which shall be not less than the maximum term provided for
first offenders . . . but, in any event, . . . not less than fifteen years, and the
maximum thereof shall be his natural life....
70. Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. R.
238 (1948).
71. People ex rel Marclay v. Lawes, 254, N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487 (1930).
72. N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 457.
